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Abstract
We introduce an agent-based model for the spreading of technological developments
in socio-economic systems where the technology is mainly used for the collabora-
tion/interaction of agents. Agents use products of different technologies to collabo-
rate with each other which induce costs proportional to the difference of technolog-
ical levels. Additional costs arise when technologies of different providers are used.
Agents can adopt technologies and providers of their interacting partners in order to
reduce their costs leading to microscopic rearrangements of the system. Analytical
calculations and computer simulations revealed that starting from a random con-
figuration of different technological levels a complex time evolution emerges where
the spreading of advanced technologies and the overall technological progress of the
system are determined by the amount of advantages more advanced technologies
provide, and by the structure of the social environment of agents. We show that
agents tend to form clusters of identical technological level with a power law size
distribution. When technological progress arises, the spreading of technologies in
the system can be described by extreme order statistics.
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1 Introduction
Recently, the application of statistical physics and of the theory of critical phe-
nomena provided novel insight into the dynamics of socio-economic systems
[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,11]. Various types of models have been developed which capture
important aspects of the emergence of communities [1], opinion spreading
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[2,3,4,5,6,7] or the evolution of financial data [12]. The dynamics of innovation
and the spreading of new technological achievements show also interesting
analogies to complex physical systems [8,9,10,11]. The process of innovation
has recently been studied by introducing a technology space based on perco-
lation theory [9]. In this model new inventions arise as a result of a random
search in the technology space starting from the current best-practice frontier.
The model could reproduce the interesting observation that innovations occur
in clusters whose sizes are described by the Pareto distribution [9]. Another
important aspect of technological development is the spreading of new tech-
nological achievements. In a socio-economic system different level technologies
may coexist and compete as a result of which certain technologies proliferate
while others disappear from the system. One of the key components of the
spreading of successful technologies is the copying, i.e. members of the sys-
tem adopt technologies used by other individuals according to certain decision
mechanisms. Decision making is usually based on a cost-benefit balance so that
a technology gets adopted by a large number of individuals if the upgrading
provides enough benefits. The gradual adaptation of high level technologies
leads to spreading of technologies and an overall technological progress of the
socio-economic system.
In the present paper we consider a simple agent-based model of the spreading
of technological achievements in socio-economic systems. Agents of the model
may represent individuals or firms which use certain technologies to collabo-
rate with each other. For simplicity, we assume that costs of the cooperation
arise solely due to the incompatibility of technologies used by the agents which
then have two origins: on the one hand, difference of technological levels in-
curs cost, the larger the difference is, the higher the cost gets. On the other
hand, technologies used by agents may belong to different providers which
induce additional costs. Agents interacting with their social neighborhood can
decrease their cost by adopting technologies of their interacting partners. The
local rejection-adaptation strategy of agents can lead to interesting changes
of the system on the meso- and macro-level, namely, agents can form clus-
ters with identical technological levels, which can also be accompanied by an
overall technological progress of the system.
We analyze the time evolution of this model socio-economic system starting
from a random configuration of technological levels and providers without
considering the possibility of innovation. Based on analytic calculations and
computer simulations we study how the adaptation of technologies of interact-
ing partners leads to spreading of technological achievements. We characterize
the microstructure of communities of agents, and the technological progress
of the system on the macro level.
2
2 Model
Our model captures some relevant features of the spreading of technological
developments when they are mostly used for the cooperation of individuals.
In the model we represent the socio-economic system by a set of agents which
posses products of different technological levels and use it to cooperate with
each other. Thinking in terms of telecommunication technologies, agents are
characterized by two variables: the technological level of the product an agent
has (the technological level of the device the agent uses for communication)
is described by a real variable τ such that a larger value of τ stands for more
advanced technologies. New technologies developed by the producers reach the
agents through providers. For simplicity, we assume that there are at most two
providers active in the system and each agent belongs to one of them. The
provider of agents is characterized by an integer variable S which can take
two different values S = {−1, 1}.
The agents are assumed to cooperate with their social partners which is the
easiest if the partners have products of the same technological level. Using
technologies of different level can induce difficulties which may be realized by
additional costs. It is reasonable to assume that the cost C induced by the
collaboration of agents i and j is a monotonous function of the difference of
the technological levels |τi − τj|. For the purpose of the explicit mathemat-
ical analysis we consider the simplest functional form and cast the cost of
cooperation into the following form
C(i→ j) = a|τi − τj|+ 1
2
∆(1− SiSj). (1)
The equation expresses that being at different technological levels (having dif-
ferent τ values) incurs cost, the higher the difference is in τ the higher the
costs are, while being at the same technological level is cost-free. This crude
assumption models a socio-economic system which favors the local commu-
nities to be at the same technological level. The value of the multiplication
factor a has to be chosen to capture the effect that in case of different tech-
nological levels it is favorable for agents to be on a higher technological level
than their interacting partners. It follows that the value of a should depend
on the relative technological level of the agents with the condition
a =


a1, if τi > τj
a2, if τi < τj
where a1 < a2. (2)
The condition a1 < a2 implies that being on a higher technological level, i.e.
being more advanced than the surroundings τi > τj , can lower the costs com-
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pared to the opposite case. The second term of Eq. (1) takes into account that
the cooperation of agents belonging to different providers implies additional
expenses. We assume that this cost does not depend on the technological levels
by setting ∆ > 0 to a constant value. Note that (1/2)(1− SiSj) takes value 1
or 0 for agents of different and of the same providers, respectively, resulting in
an additional cost ∆ when agents of different providers collaborate. The arrow
→ in the argument of C in Eq. (1) expresses that due to the condition Eq.
(2) the cost function is not symmetric with respect to agents i and j. Hence,
C(i→ j) defines the cost of agent i arising due to the cooperation with agent
j and this is not equal to the cost of agent j, i.e. C(i→ j) 6= C(j → i).
If agent i has n collaborating partners with technological levels τ1, τ2, . . . , τn,
the total cost of its collaboration can be obtained by summing up the cost
function Eq. (1) over all connections
C(i) =
n∑
j=1
C(i→ j). (3)
2.1 Dynamics of the model system
The system agents can change their technological levels with the aim to mini-
mize their total costs C(i) under the conditions set by their social environment.
For simplicity, in the present form of the model no investment is considered,
which means that new technologies cannot appear in the system. Agents reject
their low level technologies and copy/adopt the more advanced ones of other
agents in order to minimize their costs. We call this microscopic mechanism
rejection-adaptation which may also improve the global technological level of
the system. Upgrading the technological level of agents does not induce cost,
i.e. there is no resistance against the change; if the adaptation is advantageous
it will be performed. The time evolution of the system proceeds as follows: at
time t the communication of agent i with technological level τ ti and provider
Sti incurs the total cost C
t(i). At time t + 1 the agent can either keep its
technological level or can take over the τ and S values of one of its social part-
ners, τ t+1i ∈ {τ ti , τ t1, τ t2, . . . , τ tn} and St+1i ∈ {Sti , St1, St2, . . . , Stn}. The possibility
which is actually realized is the choice that minimizes the total cost
Ct+1(i) = min{C(τ ∈ {τ ti , τ t1, τ t2, . . . , τ tn}, S ∈ {Sti , St1, St2, . . . , Stn})}. (4)
Based on this dynamics the time evolution can be followed by computer sim-
ulation treating the system as a cellular automaton, i.e., the dynamics Eq.
(4) is evaluated for each agent at the same time (parallel dynamics) under the
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neighborhood conditions set by the structure of the socio-economic environ-
ment.
The above dynamics results in a rather complex time evolution of the system
during which certain technologies disappear while others survive and spread
over the system. In the following we analyze the time evolution of the system
on the micro and macro level by varying the parameters a1, a2, ∆ and the
topology of the social environment of agents.
3 Mean field versus local interaction
In order to understand the decision mechanism how agents select the tech-
nology to adopt, it is useful to study simplified configurations by analytic
calculations. For clarity, first we consider only one provider in the system, or
analogously to set ∆ = 0.
Let us assume that the system is composed of a large number of agents which
have randomly distributed technological levels in an interval τmin ≤ τ ≤ τmax
with a probability density p(τ) and distribution function P (τ) =
τ∫
τmin
p(τ ′)dτ ′.
In the limiting case of an infinite range of interaction, all agents interact with
all others so that the cost of interaction of an agent of technological level τ
can be cast into the form
C(τ) = a1
τ∫
τmin
(τ − τ ′)p(τ ′)dτ ′ + a2
τmax∫
τ
(τ ′ − τ)p(τ ′)dτ ′ (5)
as a function of τ . In the next time step the agent will change its technolog-
ical level from τ to that τ ∗, which minimizes the cost function Eq. (5), i.e.
dc
dτ
|τ∗ = 0. The technology that optimizes the cost can finally be obtained as
the solution of the equation
P (τ ∗) =
1
1 + 1
r
, (6)
where r = a2/a1 is the ratio of the two cost factors a1 and a2. Due to the
infinite range of interaction all agents make the same decision, thus after a
single time step all agents adopt the same technology τ ∗ and the evolution
of the system stops. It can be seen from Eq. (6) that the optimal technology
adopted by the entire system is just determined by the ratio r = a2/a1 which
characterizes how much advantages the more advanced technology provides
compared to the less advanced ones. In the special case of r = 1 (i.e. being on a
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higher technological level does not provide any advantages), the system adopts
the median τ ∗ = m of the initial distribution of technologies p(τ) [13]. It is
interesting to note that the optimal choice τ ∗(r) is a monotonically increasing
function of r; however (and surprisingly), the most advanced technology τmax
is solely chosen in the limiting case lim
r→∞
τ ∗(r) = τmax. At any finite value of
r > 1 the large number of agents of low level technologies can force the system
to stay at a lower technological level.
In the following let us consider a finite community of n agents with technologi-
cal levels τ1 < τ2 < . . . < τn communicating with each other. The collaboration
of agent i of technological level τi with the other n− 1 agents induce the cost
C(τi) = a1
i−1∑
j=1
(τi − τj) + a2
n∑
j=i+1
(τj − τi). (7)
In the next time step the agent decides to adopt that technology among the
n−1 possibilities which minimizes the cost function Eq. (7). It can be obtained
analytically that the decision is only determined by r, namely, the ith largest
technological level is adopted τ ∗ = τi when r falls in the interval
i− 1
n− i+ 1 <r <
i
n− i for 1 ≤ i < n, (8)
n− 1<r for i = n. (9)
It can be seen from the above equations that the limits of the subintervals of
r to choose the ith and n − (i − 1)th largest τ are symmetric with respect
to r = 1. The most advanced technology τ ∗ = τn of the available ones is
adopted only if r exceeds the number of interacting partners r > n − 1. Of
course, the actual value of τ ∗ is not determined by the above equations, so
that in a system composed of a large number of local communities of agents
with randomly distributed τ values a complex time evolution emerges, which
is locally governed by Eqs. (8,9).
4 Agents on a square lattice
In order to reveal the time evolution of an ensemble of a large number of
interacting agents based on the rejection-adaptation mechanism of technolo-
gies, we consider a set of agents organized on a square lattice of size L × L
with nearest-neighbor interactions. Initially agents have randomly distributed
technological levels between 0 and 1 with a uniform distribution
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p0(τ) = 1, and P0(τ) = τ, for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. (10)
Assuming periodic boundary conditions, all agents have four interacting part-
ners. The rejection-adaptation dynamics based on the cost minimization Eq.
(4) results in a non-trivial time evolution of the system which is followed by
computer simulations treating the system locally as a cellular automaton. It
has to be emphasized that in the simulations parallel update is used, i.e. the
dynamic rule Eq. (4) is simultaneously applied to all agents keeping their in-
teracting partners fixed. This parallel dynamics is one of the sources of the
complex time evolution of the system.
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Fig. 1. Evolution of cellular automata at different values of r = a2/a1: r=1.0, 2.0,
4.0 for the upper, middle and lower rows, respectively. Snapshots were taken at the
same times in the rows: t = 1, 2, 4, 15 from left to right. The gray-scale illustrates
the technological level of single agents.
Applying the analytic results Eqs. (8,9) for the specific case of n = 4, the
agents will always copy the 1th, 2nd, 3rd or 4th largest τ of their local in-
teracting partners when the value of the parameter r falls in the intervals
0 < r < 1/3, 1/3 < r < 1, 1 < r < 3, 3 < r, respectively. Representative ex-
amples of the time evolution of a system of size L = 100 are shown in Fig. 1 for
different parameter values in the range r ≥ 1. (Note that the behavior of the
system is symmetric with respect to r = 1.) Since the system dynamics favors
local communities to use the same technology (to be at the same technological
level), the agents tend to form clusters with equal τ at any value of r. For the
case of r = 1.0, when being more advanced than the surroundings does not
provide any advantages, it can be seen that the system evolves into a frozen
cluster structure. The technological level τ of these clusters covers practically
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the entire available range with a non-trivial distribution, i.e. communities of
low level technologies can survive in the presence of highly advanced ones (see
Fig. 1a, b, c, d). At r = 2.0, where more advanced technologies are favored
by the agents (locally the second largest τ), the system converges into an al-
most completely homogeneous state of a relatively high technological level (see
Fig. 1e, f, g, h). In the simulations, initially clusters of agents with identical
τ grow and finally the entire system evolves into a homogeneous state with
all agents adopting the same technology. Locally the agents decide for the
Fig. 2. Cluster size distributions nt(S) at different time values t for r = 1. For t ≥ 30
the distribution practically does not change, it converges to a rapidly decreasing
exponential form.
second largest τ , and therefore both very low and very high level technologies
disappear during the evolution. The gray-scale also illustrates that the limit
value of τ adopted by almost all agents in Fig. 1h falls between 0.8 and 1,
i.e. it is smaller than the highest available value τmax = 1. To reach the most
advanced technologies, r has to surpass the threshold value r = 3. This regime
is illustrated in Fig. 1i, j, k, l for the specific case of r = 4, where the white
color in Fig. 1l implies that the most advanced technology τmax = 1 spraw
onto the entire lattice.
This microscopic restructuring and clusterization process of agents can be
characterized by studying the distribution nt of cluster sizes S at different
times t. A cluster is identified on the lattice as a connected set of agents
with the same technological level, where the number of agents defines the
cluster size S. The numerical results are presented in Figs. 2 and 3 for a
system of size L = 1500. It can be seen in Fig. 2 that for r = 1, after a
few time steps the cluster size distribution converges to a rapidly decreasing
exponential form, where even the largest cluster contains a relatively small
number of agents. More interesting is the regime 1 < r < 3 where agents
8
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Fig. 3. Cluster size distributions nt(S) at different time values t for r = 2 (a), and
r = 4 (b). At the parameter value r = 2.0 (a) the distribution nt(S) evolves from
an initially rapidly decreasing exponential form to a power law distribution. The
power law form proved to be the limit distribution of the system over a broad range
of cluster sizes. The value of the exponent α of the fitted power law (straight line
in the figure) α = 1.75 ± 0.05. In both cases (a) and (b) only one cluster remains
in the final state, i.e. all the agents have the same technological level. This state is
reached through a complex evolution of cluster sizes.
locally always prefer to adopt the second highest technological level. In this
case the initially exponential distribution tends to a power law as time elapses
nt(S) ∼ S−α, (11)
and keeps this functional form over a broad range of time scales (see Fig.
3a). The final homogeneous state is reached when small clusters gradually
disappear and only one large cluster remains, but the power law distribution
remains the same for a long time. The value of the exponent α was determined
numerically as α = 1.75±0.05. For r > 3 the convergence to the homogeneous
final state is faster, but even in this case a power law emerges for intermediate
times with the same exponent as before and gradually disappears as the system
gets dominated by a single cluster (see Fig. 3b).
5 Extreme order statistics and technological progress
In the previous section we have shown that our rejection-adaptation mech-
anism results in a complex time evolution with local rearrangements which
then leads to an overall system change. A very interesting aspect of the model
is that the disappearance of certain technologies and proliferation of others
may give rise to a global technological progress. In order to give a quantitative
characterization of this evolution process, we determined the distribution pt(τ)
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of technological levels τ at different times, and the mean 〈τ t〉 and standard
deviation σt of this distribution
〈
τ t
〉
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
τ ti , (σ
t)2 =
〈(
τ t −
〈
τ t
〉)2〉
. (12)
Fig. 4 shows that for r = 1, when higher level technologies do not provide
advantages for agents, the distribution pt(τ) rapidly attains a Gaussian shape.
In order to demonstrate the validity of the Gaussian form, we plot in Fig. 4
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Fig. 4. Rescaled distributions of technological levels for r = 1. The standard Gaus-
sian has a perfect agreement with the numerical results.
the rescaled distributions pt(τ)σ
t as a function of (τ − 〈τ t〉) /σt, which have an
excellent agreement with the standard Gaussian g(x) = 1/
√
2pi exp (−x2/2).
The convergence to the Gaussian is very fast, practically after 30-40 iteration
steps the system completely forgets its initial uniform state and pt attains the
limit distribution. The Gaussian implies that the fraction of agents having
very high and very low level technologies both decrease and agents tend to
copy technologies in the vicinity of the distribution mean. Consequently, the
system does not have any technological progress, the average technological
level remains constant during the time evolution, and 〈τ t〉 → 0.5 (see Fig.
6a). In addition, the standard deviation of pt attains a non-zero constant
value in the large t limit, σt → 0.12 (Fig. 6b).
In contrast, when agents locally prefer to adopt higher level technologies,
namely, the largest or the second largest τ value of the neighborhood on the
square lattice, the system undergoes a more complex time evolution involving
also extreme order statistics. For 1 < r < 3 all the agents adopt the second
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highest available technology; hence, in a large enough system the distribution
of technological levels right after the first iteration step p1(τ) is the k = 3
rank extreme distribution φkM of M = 4 variables of uniform distribution. In
PSfrag replacements
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Fig. 5. Distribution pt of the technological level τ
t
i of agents at different time values t
during the evolution of the system. For r = 2 (a) and r = 4 (b), the distribution takes
an asymmetric form with an increasing average and decreasing standard deviation.
In (a) the continuous line of t = 1 indicates φ34, furthermore, in (b) the lines of
t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 stand for φ44, φ
9
9, φ
16
16, φ
25
25, φ
36
36, which are in an excellent agreement
with the numerical results.
general, the probability density function φkM(x) of the kth largest value of M
realizations of the random variable x which has a probability density p(x) and
a distribution function P (x), can be cast into the form
φkM(x) =
M !
(k − 1)!(M − k)!P (x)
k−1(1− P (x))M−kp(x). (13)
It can be seen in Fig. 5a that by substituting the initial uniform distribution
Eq. (10) into Eq. (13), a perfect agreement is obtained between φ34 and p1(τ).
Due to the overlap of the local neighborhoods of the lattice sites, however,
at higher iteration steps the distributions pt do not follow Eq. (13) when we
substitute φkM and the corresponding distribution function recursively on the
right hand side. By increasing the number of iterations, pt gets narrower and
converges to a sharply peaked function as the final homogeneous state is ap-
proached (see Fig. 5a and Figs. 1e, f, g, h). Consequently, the average value of
the technological level increases and converges to a limit value which is smaller
than the available maximum τmax = 1. The standard deviation goes to zero
indicating the homogeneity of the final state (see Fig. 6). When the control pa-
rameter r becomes larger than 3, more advanced technologies provide so much
benefit that it is always better for agents to adopt the available highest level
technology in the local neighborhood. Consequently, pt(τ) rapidly converges
to a sharply peaked form at τmax = 1 through extreme order distributions. It
11
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Fig. 6. Average technological level
〈
τ t
〉
as a function of time t (left), and the
standard deviation σt (right). Note the symmetry of the values of
〈
τ t
〉
for r and
1/r while the corresponding standard deviations fall on the top of each other. For
r = 4 and r = 0.25 the continuous lines in both figures indicate the analytic results
which have an excellent agreement with the numerical calculations.
is interesting to note that contrary to the case of 1 < r < 3, in this regime
the distribution pt can be described by the extreme order density function φ
k
M
Eq. (13) with k = M at any time t by taking into account that M increases
as a function of time. We found a recursive formula for the time dependence
of the parameter M
Mt+1 = Mt + 5 + 2(t− 1), with M1 = 4, (14)
which describes the spreading of successful technologies as a function of time.
The continuous lines in Fig. 5b demonstrate the excellent agreement of the
above analytic prediction with the numerically obtained distribution functions.
Note that due to the symmetry of the system with respect to the parameter
value r = 1, the same holds also for r < 1/3 with φ1M , where the smallest
value (k = 1) ofMt variables given by Eq. (14) is selected. These results imply
that the average technological level in these regimes can easily be obtained
analytically, i.e. the average of the largest and of the smallest value of Mt
variables with uniform distribution can be cast into the form
〈τmax〉 = Mt/(Mt + 1), 〈τmin〉 = 1/(Mt + 1). (15)
Substituting the recursive formula of Mt into Eq. (15) a perfect agreement is
obtained with the numerical results of 〈τ t〉 presented in Fig. 6a.
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6 Two providers
By now we have studied the behavior of the system without considering the
effect of providers, i.e. all the agents belonged to the same provider. In the
following we show that the presence of more than one provider results in a
substantial change of the behavior of the system on the meso- and macro-
levels.
PSfrag replacements
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Fig. 7. (left) The asymptotic value of the average technological level 〈τ〉 = lim
t→∞
〈
τ t
〉
as a function of ∆. For large ∆ the value of 〈τ〉 converges to a limit value τ∗, which
depends on r. (right) τ∗ as a function of r together with the mean field result Eq.
(6) and the analytic solution Eqs. (8,9) for n = 4 obtained at ∆ = 0.
Let us assume that the initial technological levels are randomly distributed,
as before, but in addition a number n1 of agents have a provider S = +1 and
a number n2 has another one S = −1. The value of S is independent of the
technological levels τ . The fraction of agents belonging to the two providers
are p = n1/N and q = 1− p = n2/N , where N = n1 + n2 is the total number
of agents. In the case of an infinite range of interaction among agents (mean
field approach) it is straightforward to show that the cost function C(τ,∆) at
a finite value of ∆ can be cast into the form
C(τ,∆) = C(τ) + 2pq∆, (16)
where C(τ) denotes the mean field cost function Eq. (5) where no providers
were considered. Based on the arguments presented in Sec. 3, it follows that
after one iteration step the system minimizes the cost function by attaining a
uniform state where the median m of the initial distribution of technological
levels is copied by all agents and they choose the same provider, namely, the
one with the higher initial fraction.
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A more interesting (and more realistic) situation occurs when agents of the
two providers separate according to the technological levels, i.e. we assume
that the n1 agents of the S = −1 provider have the same technological level
τ1, while the n2 agents of the S = +1 provider have a different one τ2, where
τ1 > τ2. We can determine analytically that even if higher level technologies
provide advantages (r > 1), the agents choose the lower level technology τ2 to
minimize C(τ,∆) if the excess cost ∆ induced by the interaction of agents of
different providers surpass a threshold value
n2a2 − n1a1
n1 − n2 (τ1 − τ2) < ∆. (17)
In the specific case of n1 = n2 the decision of agents does not depend on the
value of ∆, it is only determined by the ratio r, as it was the case when there
was only one provider present in the system (n1 = 0 or n2 = 0). In local
communities (smaller groups of agents) in an extended system such inhomo-
geneous configurations can frequently occur when two different providers have
different number of agents with a clear separation of their technological levels.
The above results imply that in such cases ∆ can have a substantial effect on
the behavior of the system by modifying the optimal decision of agents with
respect to the ∆ = 0 case. In order to give a quantitative characterization of
the effect of ∆ on the micro- and macro-level of the socio-economic system, we
carried out computer simulations on a square lattice varying the value of ∆ in
a broad range for fixed r parameters. The calculations started from a uniform
distribution of technological levels where the two providers had the same frac-
tion p = 0.5 and q = 0.5. Computer simulations revealed that as time elapses
the average technological level 〈τ t〉 converges to a limit value which depends
both on r and ∆. Fig. 7a presents representative examples of the large time
limit of 〈τ t〉 as a function of ∆ for several different values of r = a2/a1 in the
range 1 < r < 3. It can be seen that at ∆ = 0 all the curves obtained at differ-
ent r values start from the same point; however, as ∆ increases the curves split
up and the system follow r-dependent histories. For very large ∆ the system
converges to a limit value τ ∗(r) which solely depends on the parameter r. Fig.
7b presents a comparison of the τ ∗ obtained analytically, results of computer
simulations performed on a square lattice with ∆ = 0 (one provider), and the
∆ → ∞ limit values τ ∗(r) of 〈τ〉 as a function of r. It is interesting to note
that in the regime r > 1 for most of the cases the presence of two providers
makes possible a more intense technological progress, i.e. agents have a higher
tendency to adopt technologies closer to the possible maximum compared to
the case of a single provider. As ∆ increases the system converges to a steady
state where the average technological level is higher than it was with a single
provider.
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7 Discussion
We presented an agent-based cellular automata model to study the spread of
technological achievements in socio-economic systems. Agents of the model
can represent individuals or firms which use different level technologies to
collaborate with each other. Costs arise due to the incompatibility of techno-
logical levels and to different technological providers. Agents can reduce their
costs by adopting the technologies and providers of their interacting partners.
We showed by analytic calculations and computer simulations that the local
adaptation-rejection mechanism of technologies results in a complex time evo-
lution accompanied by microscopic rearrangements of technologies with the
possibility of technological progress on the macrolevel. We showed that agents
tend to form clusters of equal technological levels. If higher level technologies
provide advantages for agents, the system evolves to a homogeneous state but
clusters show a power law size distribution for intermediate times. The redis-
tribution of technological levels involves extreme order statistics leading to an
overall technological progress of the system. The presence of providers proved
to play a substantial role in the time evolution. The competition of providers
seems to make the system more sensitive to advantages provided by the higher
level technologies and can lead to additional technological progress by forcing
the agents to select locally the more advanced technology.
Our model emphasizes the importance of copying in the spreading of tech-
nological achievements and considers one of the simplest possible dynamical
rules for the decision mechanism. In the model calculations no innovation was
considered, i.e., agents could not improve their technological level by locally
developing a new technology instead of only taking over of the technology of
others. Innovation in the model can be taken into account by randomly select-
ing agents to increase their technological level by a random amount according
to some probability distribution. The generalization of the model in this direc-
tion is in progress. Our calculations show also the importance of the structure
of local communities in the time evolution of the system which addresses in-
teresting questions for future studies of the model varying the coordination
number of the lattice, and on small-world and scale-free network topologies
[4,6,7,14,15]. The emergence of power law size distribution of clusters of agents
with equal technological level and the behavior of the exponents on different
topologies can be relevant also for applications.
Compared to opinion spreading models like the Sznajd-model [2,3] and its
variants [4,6,7], the main difference is that in our case the technological level
of agents is a continuous random variable; furthermore, the decision making
is not a simple majority rule but involves a minimization procedure. A closer
analogy can be found when two providers are considered in the system so
that the spreading of a provider could be interpreted as a success of one of
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two competing “opinions”. Opinion of individuals can also be represented by a
continuous real variable which makes possible to study under which conditions
consensus, polarization or fragmentation of the system can occur [8]. Such
models show more similarities to our spreading model of technologies.
It is interesting to note that our model captures some of the key aspects of the
spreading of telecommunication technologies, where for instance mobile phones
of different technological levels are used by agents to communicate/interact
with each other. In this case, for example, the incompatibility of MMS-capable
mobile phones with the older SMS ones may motivate the owner to reject or
adopt the dominating technology in his social neighborhood by taking into
account the offers of providers of the interacting partners.
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